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ACADEMIC TREATMENT OF
ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA
IN LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
TEXTBOOKS
PROLIFE CENTER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS

In order to "identify, catalog, and respond to current academic
coverage of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in law school
teaching materials,"' the five leading textbooks for Constitutional

Law courses were analyzed. These texts include: Cases and
Materials on Constitutional Law: Themes for the Constitution's
Third Century by Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Jr., and
Philip P. Frickey; 2 ConstitutionalLaw by Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis
Michael Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, Mark V. Tushnet, and Pamela S.
Karlan; Constitutional Law by Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald
Gunther;4 Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes by Ronald D.
Rotunda;' and ConstitutionalLaw: Cases and Materials by Jonathan
D. Varat, William Cohen, and Vikram D. Amar.6
Many of the texts include lengthy excerpts of the relevant
both abortion and euthanasia jurisprudence, with only a
in
cases
couple textbooks providing substantial notes and questions after the
edited opinions. This report will first analyze the textbooks' treatment

1. Grant Proposal, Prolife Center at University of St. Thomas, Life Issues in the Law School
Curriculum, 2 (2010) (on file with Prof. Teresa Collett).
2. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD
CENTURY (4th ed. 2009).
3. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2009).
4. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (17th ed. 2010).
5. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES (8th ed.
2007).
6. JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (13th ed.
2009).
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of euthanasia, followed by an analysis of the treatment of abortion.
Because the textbooks surveyed do not include a separat'e discussion
of infanticide, this report does not include a specific summary of the
textbooks' approaches to that issue.

EUTHANASIA
FARBER, ESKRIDGE, JR., AND FRICKEY

The text's treatment of euthanasia only includes the edited
opinion of Washington v. Glucksberg, providing approximately four
pages of excerpts from the majority opinion, as well as portions of:
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, Justice Stevens' concurrence in
judgment, Justice Souter's concurrence in judgment, and Justice
Breyer's concurrence in judgment.' One note following the
Glucksberg opinion recognizes the difficulty in identifying the
holding of the case and includes an argument from David
Orentlicher, stating "in effect, by endorsing potentially lethal sedation
of terminal patients (which is normally accompanied by withholding
of hydration and nutrition), the Court has rejected assisted suicide
only to embrace euthanasia. This same note illustrates how Chief
Justice Rehnquist "sidesteps any criticism of Roe or Casey" and
"avoids any reliance on Bowers."' Another note highlights the
difference in approaching substantive due process and historical
practices, exemplified by Justice Souter and Chief Justice
Rehnquist's respective opinions. 0 This note concludes with a
quotation from Richard Fallon's The Supreme Court, 1996 TermForeword: Implementing the Constitution." While yet another note
follows, its focus is on substantive due process in general, and thus
does not necessitate discussion in this analysis.12

7. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 626-34.
8. Id at 634 (citing David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Physician-AssistedSuicide,
337 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1236 (1997)).
9. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 634.

10.
11.

Id.at634-35.

Id. at 635 (citing Richard Fallon, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARv. L. REv. 54, 145 (1997)).
12. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 635 (discussing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

U.S. 833 (1998)).
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STONE, SEIDMAN, SUNSTEIN, TUSHNET, AND KARLAN

Stone includes its discussion of euthanasia under the
subheading "The Right to Die" within the Implied Fundamental
Rights chapter of the book." The topic is introduced with excerpts
from Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health, including
portions of: the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
Justice Scalia's concurrence, Justice Brennan's dissent, and Justice
Stevens' dissent.14 The first note following the opinion recognizes
that Cruzan identifies a liberty interest but does not address whether
that interest is a fundamental right, which ultimately leads to a
decision that appears "exceedingly narrow."" Another note attempts
to draw the relationship between Cruzan and other privacy cases,
providing an excerpt from Seidman's Confusion at the Border:
Cruzan, "The Right to Die, " and the Public/PrivateDistinction." The
last note provides an argument that the state "has no legitimate
interest in interfering with the parents' decision in cases like
Cruzan."7
The text also contains excerpts from Washington v.
Glucksberg, including portions of: Parts I and II, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, as well as Justice Stevens', Justice Souter's, Justice
Ginsburg's, and Justice Breyer's separate concurrences in judgment."
One note following this opinion briefly summarizes Vacco v. Quill to
illustrate the distinction between the prohibited practice of doctorassisted suicide and the permitted practice of refusing life-saving
treatment.19 Another pair of notes illuminates both the difficulty in
determining the precise holding of Glucksberg becuase Justice
O'Connor joined the majority yet wrote a separate concurring
opinion,20 as well as the differing views as to the proper treatment of
history.2 '

13.

STONE ET AL., supra note

14.

Id at 927-32.

15.

Id at 932.

3, at 927.

16. Id at 933 (citing Seidman, Confusion at the Border: Cruzan, "The Right to Die," and the
Public/PrivateDistinction, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 68-70).
17. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 933.
18. Id. at 933-40.

19. Id. at 940.
20.
21.

Id. at 940.
Id. at 941.
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SULLIVAN AND GUNTHER

This text discusses euthanasia within the "Privacy" section of
the Due Process chapter; and more specifically, under the heading,
"Substantive Due Process and Rights Over Death."2 2 The topic is
introduced with several questions and a lengthy summary of Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, including summaries of the
majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, and Justice
Brennan's dissent.2 3 Following this summary, the text states that
Cruzan left open the "question whether there was a liberty right or
'interest' sufficient to invalidate a law with the effect of barring
altogether the assistance of a physician in accelerating one's death. It
also left open the question of what level of scrutiny might apply to
each claim."24 The text further suggests that Washington v.
Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill answer these questions.2 5
The Washington v. Glucksberg opinion follows, including
excerpts from the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
Justice Stevens' concurrence in judgments, Justice Souter's
concurrence in judgment, and Justice Breyer's concurrence in
judgments.2 6 The first note after Glucksberg examines "the two
competing approaches reflected in Glucksberg to discerning privacy
rights implicit in substantive due process," by highlighting Chief
Justice Rehnquist's narrow positivist approach and Justice Souter's
"broader view of privacy as freedom from arbitrary restraint." 27 A
second note discusses the right to die and equal protection by
summarizing the majority opinion, as well as Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, from Vacco v. Quill, and stating that in that case "the
Court held that New York did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
by prohibiting assisted suicide while permitting patients to refuse
lifesaving medical treatment." 28 The text also mentions a footnote by
Justice Rehnquist, in which he stated that the holding "did not
foreclose possible as-applied challenges, but stated that 'a particular
plaintiff hoping to show that New York's assisted-suicide ban was
22.
23.

SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra
Id. at 484-86.

note 4, at 484.

24. Id at 486.
25. Id. (instructing the reader to "distinguish four different situations in which one might seek
to accelerate one's death: (1) suicide when one is healthy or only temporarily ill; (2) withdrawal of
life support when one is terminally ill; (3) physician-assisted suicide when one is terminally ill; (4)
active euthanasia by a physician when one is terminally ill.").
26. Id at 486-93.
27. Id at 493.
28. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 493-494.
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unconstitutional in his particular case would need to present different
and considerably stronger arguments than those advanced by
respondents here." 29 The final note lists a series of challenges,
touched upon in the concurring opinions in Glucksberg and Quill,
which seemed to be left open.3 0
ROTUNDA

The "Right to Die" issue is embedded within the
"Fundamental Rights" section of the "Equal Protection" chapter and
is introduced by the edited opinion of Cruzan v. Director,Missouri
Department of Health.3 1 This version contains lengthy excerpts from
the majority opinion,3 2 a paragraph portion of Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, 3 3 an excerpt from Justice Scalia's concurrence,34 parts of
Justice Brennan's dissent," and a paragraph of Justice Stevens'
dissent.3 6 The text only provides one short note after the opinion,
concerning the lower court's further finding that the Cruzan family
"had met the clear and convincing evidence standard" and the Court
ordered the feeding tube to be removed.
Following the Cruzan opinion, the text provides excerpts
from Washington v. Glucksberg including portions of Parts I and 11.38
The editors inserted a note after the Glucksberg opinion explaining
that the Court decided Vacco v. Quill on the same day as Glucksberg
and the separate opinions of Justice O'Connor, Justice Stevens,
Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg for the two cases follow the
edited opinion of Vacco. 9 The text then provides excerpts from the
Vacco opinion,4 0 followed by portions of: Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, 4' Justice Stevens' concurrence in judgment,4 2 Justice
Souter's concurrence in judgment,43 Justice Ginsburg's concurrence

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id at 494.
Id. at 494-95.
ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 922.
Id at 922-27.
Id at 927.
Id. at 927-30.
Id. at 930-31.
Id, at 931.
ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 931.
Id. at 931-38.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 938-41.
Id. at 941-42.
Id. at 942.

43.

ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 942-43. An editor's note follows this separate opinion in
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in judgment," and Justice Breyer's concurrence in judgment.4 5 The
text also offers a brief glimpse into the Netherlands' complete
decriminalization of euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide by
providing statistics from governmental reports, Lancet British
medical journal, the Dutch Pediatric Society, and The Royal Dutch
Society for Pharmacology.4 6
VARAT, COHEN, AND AMAR

Euthanasia is treated within the chapter discussing the Due
Process Clause, and more specifically, "Personal Autonomy" within
the "Protection of Personal Liberties."4 7 While the only case included
in this section is Washington v. Glucksberg, the excerpted version is
notably long, including portions of: Part I and II of the majority
opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, Justice Stevens'
concurrence in judgment, Justice Souter's concurrence in judgment,
and Justice Breyer's concurrence in judgments. 48 The text also
includes a lengthy footnote, providing a summary of the Vacco v.
Quill decision. 4 9 There are no further notes or citations to journal
articles exploring this topic.

ABORTION
FARBER, ESKRIDGE, JR., AND FRICKEY

The first instance the abortion issue is mentioned within
Farber is in the text's first chapter entitled "A Prologue on
Constitutional History." 0 Noting that the Court "expanded the right
to privacy to assure women the right to abortion," the text gives
background facts to Roe v. Wade and states that Griswold "served as
the constitutional basis for a vigorous women's 'pro-choice'
movement in the 1960's."' The text then summarizes Roe, as well as
the criticism that the Court "was not enforcing any kind of text in the

which Justice Souter explains his reasoning concerning Glucksberg.
44. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 943.
45. Id.
46. Id (citing Richard Minter, The Dutch Way of Death, WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 25,
2001, at A20).
47. VARAT ET AL., supra note 6, at 408.
48. Id. at 463-76.
49. Id. at 467.
50. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 50.
51. Id.
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abortion cases [following Roe]."52 The text finishes its brief
introduction to the topic by illustrating that, despite predictions of
Roe's demise, it was reaffirmed (and reinterpreted) in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey.53
Most of the abortion discussion is within the section entitled
"Protecting Fundamental Rights."54 The text begins with Roe v.
Wade, edited to include approximately four pages of excerpts from
the majority opinion, and approximately one page of excerpts from
Justice Rehnquist's dissent." The text then includes a summary of
Doe v. Bolton, along with a question as to whether the age of the
statute made a difference in the Court's decision. 6 The text also
provides a summary of the legislative history surrounding abortion
and questions whether the Court acted too soon and instead should
have left the progression of abortion to the legislature, as with
contraception." The text asks two further questions concerning the
Roe decision: whether a more limited and more aggressive rational
basis review would have sufficed;" and whether Roe is "just Lochner
in feminist garb" or if there is a principled reason for viewing
abortion as a fundamental right.59 The text then discusses Chief
Justice Burger's emphasis that the independent medical judgment of
the physician is a "crucial element in the abortion decision" as well as
the reality that abortion clinics appear to undercut Roe's expectation
of "direct patient-physician dialogue" that may serve as a barrier to
on-demand abortions.6 0 The last note included in this section is a
summary of Mary Ann Glendon's findings in Abortion and Divorce
in Western Law.6 1
After these shorter notes, the text includes longer excerpts
from Reasoningfrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection by Reva Siegel; 62
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
52.

Id

53.

Id at 50-51

54.

Id at 570.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id at 570-74.
FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 575.
Id.
Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 576.

61.

Id. (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)).

62. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 576-77 (citing Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.

REv. 261, 276-77, 350-51 (1992)).
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Wade by Ruth Bader Ginsburg; 63 and A Defense of Abortion by
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 64 The text then discusses several decisions
between Roe and Casey, in which the abortion right further
developed. 65 The text provides summaries of PlannedParenthoodv.
6
1 PlannedParenthoodv. Ashcroft;' H.L.
Danforth;6 6 Bellotti v. Baird;
69
v. Matheson; Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health;"
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists;" Colautti v. Franklin;2 Maher v. Roe; Harris v.
McRae;74 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services;" and Hodgson v.
6
Minnesota.1
An edited opinion of Casey follows, including portions of
Parts I, 11111, IV and VI, a summary of Part V, a summary of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in part and dissent in part, and
excerpts from Justice Scalia's concurrence in judgment in part and
dissent in part.77 After the edited Casey opinion, the text discusses
spousal notification, waiting periods," parental consent with judicial
bypass," and the fetus as a person."' Another note highlights the
contrast between the authors of Casey's joint opinion.8 2 Following
these notes, the text provides a summary of the Stenberg v. Carhart
decision" as an introduction to the edited version of Gonzales v.
Carhartthat follows and serves as a conclusion to the discussion of
abortion in this chapter.8 4
63. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 578 (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382-83 (1985)).
64. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, 578. (citing Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion,
1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971)).
65. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 579-82.
66. Id. at 579.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id
70. Id at 579-80.
71. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 580.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id. at 580-81.
76. Id. at 581.
77. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 582-93.
78. Id. at 593-95.
79. Id. at 595.

80.

Id.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id at 595-96.
Id. at 596-97.
FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 597-98.
Id. at 598-607 (including portions of I, Ill-B, Ill-C, IV-A, IV-B and V of the majority

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W TEXTBOOKS

2011]

19

After this main discussion of abortion, however, the text once
again addresses the topic in the First Amendment chapter." Within
this chapter, the text includes summaries of the majority opinion,
Justice Souter's concurrence, Justice Scalia's dissent, and Justice
Kennedy's dissent from the Hill v. Colorado opinion.86 The text also
provides an edited version of Rust v. Sullivan, including portions of
the majority opinion and Justice Blackmun's dissent." Lastly, this
chapter contains a summary of Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc., including both a summary of the majority opinion and Justice
Scalia's dissent."
STONE, SEIDMAN, SUNSTEIN, TUSHNET, AND KARLAN

Although much of the abortion discussion in this book is
included in the chapter entitled Implied Fundamental Rights, 9 the
text addresses the topic in several other sections throughout the book.
One chapter that also discusses abortion is the Freedom of Expression
chapter.90 Within this chapter, the text includes a summary of Bigelow
v. Virginia, in which the Court "reversed the conviction of an
individual who . . . published in his newspaper an advertisement

announcing the availability of legal abortions in New York" because
"[i]t contained factual material of clear 'public interest.""' The text
also provides summaries and excerpts from Madsen v. Women 's
Health Center, Inc.,9 Frisby v. Schultz,93 Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York, 94 and Hill v. Colorado." Additionally,
a portion of the Rust v. Sullivan opinion appears in this chapter. 96
Many of the notes following this edited opinion focus on Freedom of
Expression issues rather than abortion issues.97 Lastly, Stone includes
opinion; a summary of Justice Thomas' concurrence; and excerpts from Justice Ginsburg's
dissent).
85. Id. at 654-813 (Chapter 6).
86.
87.

Id. at 721-22.
Id at 727-30.

88.

Id. at 738.

89.

STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 711-1016 (Chapter VI).

90. Id at
91. Id at
92. Id at
93. Id at
94.
95.

1017-1440 (Chapter VII).
1153.
1128, 1265, 1271-72.
1270.

Id. at 1272.
STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1272.

96. Id.at 1310-12.
97. Id. at 1312-14 (including notes regarding government speech, the government's
subsidization of programs, and a relationship between Rust v. Sullivan and Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of University of Virginia).
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a summary of Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, providing portions of the majority opinion and the
dissenting opinion, as an example of a case addressing expressing a
political point of view.98
Another chapter that addresses abortion is The Constitution
and Religion." Within this chapter, Harris v. McRae is summarized
as the Court rejecting "an establishment clause attack on a statute
restricting public financing of abortions." 0 The text also summarizes
Bowen v. Kendrick, in which the Court held that the Adolescent
Family Life Act did not violate the establishment clause.o' Protecting
Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and
Formal Neutrality by Bowen is included in this chapter as well, and
though not specifically about abortion, the text provides an example
centered around an informed-consent requirement for abortion to
illustrate the differing standards applied when women seek an
abortion for secular reasons, compared to women who seek abortions

for religious reasons.102
Yet another chapter that includes a discussion of abortion is
State Action, Baselines, and the Problem of Private Power. 03 Within
this chapter there are lengthy summaries of Rust v. Sullivan'04 and
Maher v. Roe'05 to illustrate unconstitutional conditions on
government benefits.'0 6 The Role of the Supreme Court in the
Constitutional Order chapter also touches on abortion. 0 This chapter
mentions that a constitutional amendment addressing abortion has
been offered unsuccessfully,'" that Reagan's Supreme Court
appointees, on issues of individual autonomy, including abortion,
have been divided,109 that there have been proposals to prevent the
Supreme Court from hearing cases involving abortion,"0 and that, in
one view, branches of government other than courts act properly

98. Id. at 1074-76.
99. Id at 1443-1539 (Chapter Vlll).
100. Id at 1488.
101. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1506.
102. Id. at 1522-23 (citing Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of
Free Speech Doctrine and FormalNeutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 191-92 (2002)).
103. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1543-1608 (Chapter IX).
104. Id at 1599-1600.
105. Id at 1600-01.
106. Id at 1598.
107. Id at 1- 162 (Chapter I).
108. Id at 80.
109. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 81.
110. Id at 86.
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when they interpret the Constitution more expansively than does the
Court and then perhaps "political branches are within their rights if
they conclude (for example) that . . . government must fund

abortions-even if the Supreme Court disagrees."'"
The final chapter that examines the abortion issue apart from
the main treatment of the topic is Equality and the Constitution." 2 In
this chapter, the text includes an excerpt from Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution,"' a note discussing "de facto" wealth classifications,
stating that "[t]he primary context in which equal protection claims
involving wealth have arisen involve . . . claims that the government

has wrongly failed to subsidize some activity that can be engaged in
only if one has the money to purchase it in private markets (for
example, the failure to subsidize abortions when the government
subsidizes other medical care under Medicaid),"l" 4 a statement that
"[p]owerful arguments have been advanced that our preference for
the born over fetuses, or for people over animals represents no more
than chauvinism,""' and a short summary of Harris v. McRae in
connection with affirmative rights under the Equal Protection Clause

of the Constitution.116
As previously mentioned, the majority of the abortion
discussion occurs within the Implied Fundamental Rights chapter. "'
In the introduction of the chapter, the text includes a statement that
"[o]thers have criticized the Court for creating a right to abortion
without clear textual foundation in Roe v. Wade . . [""I Stone then
begins the discussion of abortion, like many other textbooks, with the
Roe v. Wade opinion." 9 The text includes approximately four pages
of excerpts from the majority opinion, as well as portions of: Justice
Stewart's concurrence, Justice Douglas' concurrence, Justice White's
dissent with whom Justice Rehnquist joins, and Justice Rehnquist's

dissent.120
111. Id at6l.
112. Id at Chapter V.
113. Id at 656 (citing Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev.
955, 1007 (1984).
114. STONE ETAL., supra note 3, at 698.
115. Id. at 687 (signaling to J. NOONAN, THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 51-58 (1970); and T. REGAN & P. SINGER, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND
HUMAN OBLIGATIONS (1976)).
116. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 703.
117. See id at 711.
118. Id.
119. Id.at843.
120. Id at 843-49.
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Three notes following the case1 21 discuss the precedent
leading to Roe and the rights to privacy and reproductive autonomy
established in Roe,122 including excerpts from The Wages of Crying
Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wadel 23 as a criticism of the opinion and
excerpts from The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Criticsl24 in support of the opinion. One note also brings up issues
relating to artificial insemination and potential genetic parenthood.125
Another note discusses the issue of abortion and sex discrimination,12 6
providing excerpts from several articles including: Karst's Book
Review, 127 Tribe's Constitutional Choices,128 Regan's Rewriting Roe
v. Wade, 2 9 Ely's The Wages of Crying Wolf* A Comment on Roe v.
Wade,' MacKinnon's Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology,"' as
well as a string cite to other articles that consider abortion and sex
discrimination. 3 2 Yet another note discusses the issue of compelling
state interests,"' providing excerpts from Epstein's Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases;'34 Tribe's
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law;"' and Tribe's American ConstitutionalLaw."'

121. Idat849-50.
122. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 849-51.
123. Id at 849, 850 (citing Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 930, 935-36, 947 (1973)).
124. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 849-50 (citing Heymann & Barzelay, The Forestand the
Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765, 772-73, 775 (1973)).
125. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 851 (including several hypothetical questions and citing
Cohen, The Constitutionand the Rights Not to Procreate,60 STAN. L. REv. 1135 (2008)).
126. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 851-52.
127. Id at 851 (citing Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1036-37 (1976)).
128. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 851. (citing L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 243
(1985)).
129. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 851. (citing Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1569 (1979)).
130. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 852 (citing Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933-35 (1973)).
131. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 852. (citing MACKINNON, ROE V. WADE: A STUDY IN
MALE IDEOLOGY IN ABORTION-MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 49, 51 (J. Garfield ed.
1985)).
132. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 852.
133. Id. at 852-53.
134. Id. at 853 (citing Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159, 172, 176, 182)).
135. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 853 (citing L. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process ofLife and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11, 15, 22 (1973)).
136. STONE ET AL., supra note 3 at 853 (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1350 (2d ed. 1988) and L. TRIBE, ABORTION: A CONFLICT OF ABSOLUTES (1990)).

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W TEXTBOOKS

2011]

23

Two other notes examine the controversy surrounding the
issue of the fetus as a person.'13 One view summarized by the text
states that if the fetus is a person, or if the interest in protecting it is
compelling, Roe is necessarily wrong.'"3 For support of this view, the
text provides another excerpt from Tribe's American Constitutional
Law. 3' Another view summarized in the text contends that the
contestable claims surrounding abortion should play absolutely no
role in constitutional law.140 Following this assertion, the text
provides an excerpt from Thomson's A Defense of Abortion.1" n a
similar vein, the text offers a discussion of the viability issue,
including an exploration of the points that "viability is not
biologically fixed" and "[t]he point of viability varies from fetus to

fetus."

42

The final note states that "Roe has been subject to strong
attacks from a wide variety of quarters" and the post-Roe cases that
follow should be considered in the context of sustained political
campaigns designed on the one hand to end, and on the other hand to
preserve, the abortion right."' The casebook then summarizes the
opinions of Maher v. Roe 44 and Harris v. McRae,'4 5 including
excerpts from the majority and dissenting opinions, as well as further
notes regarding abortion funding.146 Within this series of notes, the
text offers excerpts from three articles to illustrate the differing
reactions to the abortion-funding cases, including portions from
Perry's Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde
Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae;147 Westen's
Correspondence;148 and Tribe's Constitutional Choices.149 The text

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 853-55.
Id. at 853.
Id at 853-54 (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 931 (1978)).
STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 854.
Id. at 854-55 (citing Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49,

55-59 (1971)).
142. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 855 (citing Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 (1973); and Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 269 (1975)).
143. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 855.
144. Id at 855-58.
145. Id. at 858-59.
146. Id at 859-60.
147. Id at 859 (citing Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde
Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113, 1115-16, 1125

(1980)).
148.

STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 859 (citing Westen, Correspondence,33 STAN. L. REV.

1187 (1981)).
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also mentions a potential relationship between these cases and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.5 0 Lastly, this series of notes
provides a short, introductory summary of Rust v. Sullivan to
illustrate how the Harrisand Maher precedent was expanded."'
Following this set of notes the text offers a survey of cases
exemplifying "Abortion Regulation between Roe and Casey."52
Stone includes summaries of the following cases: City of Akron v.
Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc.,'" Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri v. Danforth,5 4 Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,"' Colautti v. Franklin,'6
Planned ParenthoodAss'n of Kansas City v. Danforth,'" Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,'" H.L. v. Matheson,"' Bellotti v.
Baird,'60 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,'6 ' and Hodgson v.

Minnesota.162
Stone then includes a lengthy excerpt of Casey, providing
portions of: Parts 1-VI, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in part,
concurrence in judgment in part, and dissent in part, Justice Stevens'
concurrence in part and dissent in part, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence in judgment in part and dissent in part, and Justice
Scalia's concurrence in judgment in part and dissent in part.163 After
the Casey decision, the text uses several notes to explore the role of
the Court." The notes include an inference that the judges act
independently of politics,1 65 as well as a brief discussion of stare
decisis in constitutional history.166 The issue of gender equality in
relationship to abortion also surfaces again in these notes, including
149.

STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 859-60 (citing L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES,

243-44 (1985)).
150. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 860 (signaling to Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions,
102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1989)).
151.

STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 860.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id
Id. at 860-61, 863.
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id
STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 862-63.
Id at 863.
STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 864-82.
Id at 882-83.
Id at 882.
Id.
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Strauss' argument that Casey, for the first time, suggests that these
issues be central to the abortion debate.'16 Within this same note, the
text briefly touches upon Dworkin's contention regarding the
"'essentially religious' nature of the key question, which is the
sanctity of human life."16 A last note following the Casey decision
questions the value that has been placed on the Roe decision and the
abortion issue in America.'6 9
An edited version of Gonzales v. Carhartfollows, including
portions of Parts I-V, Justice Thomas' concurrence, and Justice
Ginsburg's dissent.' 70 The text concludes its discussion of abortion
with a section entitled "The Future of Abortion Rights."' Within this
section, the text offers possible governmental interests advanced by
the Partial Birth Abortion Act, and cites Siegel's The New Politics of
Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion
Restrictions,'72 a statement from Justice Ginsburg implying that the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act unduly burdens the right to an
7
considerations for facial and as-applied challenges, stating
abortion,'1
that the "Court leaves open the possibility that individual women can
challenge the statute as applied to them on the ground that a standard
D & E would risk their health," 74 and a last note provides three main
possibilities for evaluating the "long-term" winners and losers in the
Gonzales v. Carhartdecision. 7
SULLIVAN AND GUNTHER

The abortion issue in ConstitutionalLaw is introduced in the
last note following the text's edited version of Griswold v.
Connecticut.7 6 The note explains that the decisions of Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Casey "were limited on their facts to the prevention
of pregnancy through the use of contraception."' 7 The note then
introduces Roe v. Wade as the question of if the privacy calculus in
167. Id at 882-83 (citing Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1993 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 27).
168. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 883 (citing R. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993)).
169. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 883.

170.

Id. at 883-97.

171. Id at 897-98.
172. Id. at 897-98 (citing to Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of
Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991).
173. STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 898.

174.

Id.

175.
176.

Id. .
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 437.

177. Id.
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reproductive decision making is altered once a pregnancy has
begun."' The text then includes excerpts of the majority opinion in
Roe, totaling approximately two-and-one-half pages, as well as short
paragraph excerpts of Justice Stewart's concurrence, Justice White's
dissent, and Justice Rehnquist's dissent.'79
Following the edited version of Roe, Sullivan includes several
notes further illuminating other issues and jurisprudence surrounding
the abortion issue.iso The first note examines the privacy interest that
Roe protects.'"' Stating that the Fourteenth Amendment's right to
privacy differs from Griswold's Ninth Amendment or penumbras
approaches, the note then provokes inquiries into the breadth of this
privacy interest and cites A Defense of Abortion for the foundation
that there may be a "presumptive right of decisional autonomy over
the use of one's body for the life support of others even assuming that
a countervailing life is at stake[.]"' 82 Next, the text examines the
balance of competing government interests, stating that the "Court
finds that the woman's prima facie right to end her pregnancy can be
defeated only by 'compelling' state interests."11as The note then
explores the two main governmental interests, which are to protect
the life of the mother and to protect the potential life of the fetus, and
the differing measuring standards depending on which trimester the
pregnancy is in.'84 The note continues by stating that there is no
consensus as to when life begins and suggests comparing Abortion:
the Clash of Absolutes by Tribe,"' with How Not to Promote Serious
DeliberationAbout Abortion by McConnell,' 86 for contrasting views
as to whether the Court should defer or invalidate a state's judgment
regarding abortion laws.'
Another note includes one piece of criticism and one piece of
support for Roe.' One argument stems from The Wages of Crying
Wolf/ A Comment on Roe v. Wade, stating that "Roe is even less
178.

Id at 437-38.

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 438-41.
Id at 441-48.
Id. at 441.
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 441 (citing Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of

Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971)).

183.
184.

SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 441.
Id. at 441-42.

185.

Id (citing TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)).

186. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 441-42. (citing McConnell, How Not to
Promote Serious DeliberationAbout Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. R-Ev. 1181 (1991)).
187. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 442.
188.

Id .
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defensible than Lochner because, rather than resting on the
illegitimacy of the ends sought or the lack of a 'plausible argument'
that the legislative means further permissible ends, Roe simply
announces that the 'goal is not important enough to sustain the
restriction."' 1 9 The piece of support from Tribe's Foreword:Toward
a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law suggests that
the Court determined that "'some types of choices ought to be
remanded, on principle, to private decision-makers unchecked by
substantive governmental control.""" The text also includes a note
on "Roe and Sex Equality," providing a string citation of journal
articles that suggest that abortion law "implicates equality concerns,"
as well as "sociological evidence that attitudes to abortion correlate
closely with attitudes toward gender roles."9 1 Yet another note
discusses the political reaction to Roe, mentioning both attempts at
constitutional amendments and legislative initiatives. 192
The text also includes a long note discussing several
regulations surrounding abortion law and the related cases that
upheld or overturned these regulations.'"9 The note first discusses
"regulations of medical procedures" and includes paragraph
summaries of both Doe v. Bolton and Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health.19 4 The note next provides a short discussion of
"spousal and parental consent requirements," briefly summarizing the
decisions of Planned Parenthoodof Central Missouri v. Danforth,1"
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I and Bellotti II), 196Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft,'9 H.L. v. Matheson,'" Hodgson v.

189. Id. (citing Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973)).
190. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
191. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 442-43 (citing Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 955(1984); Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1029 (1976);
MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 45 (Garfield & Hennessey eds. 1984); and LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS
OF MOTHERHOOD (1984)).
192. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 443.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 443-48.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443-44.
Id at 444.
Id.
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 444.
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Minnesota,'9 9 and Ohio v. Akron Ctr.for Reproductive Health.200 The
note also offers a short examination of "waiting period and reporting
requirements" by summarizing another portion of Akron v. Akron
Centerfor Reproductive Health as well as the holding of Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 20 Lastly,
the text briefly analyzes "abortion funding restrictions."20 2 This final
section offers lengthier summaries of Maher v. Roe, including
excerpts from the majority opinion, Justice Brennan's dissent, and
Justice Marshall's dissent; 203 Harris v. McRae, with portions of the
majority opinion, Justice Brennan's dissent, and Justice Stevens'
dissent;204 Rust v. Sullivan, including excerpts from the majority
opinion, as well as Justice Blackmun's dissent;2 05 and Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services.206
The last note following the excerpted decision of Roe
describes how Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas
expressed a view that the case was wrongly decided and Justice
O'Connor expressed doubt about elaborations of the decision. 2 07 The
note concludes with a quote from Abortion Politics: Writing for an
Audience of One by Estrich and Sullivan that establishes the premise
that Justice O'Connor would not overrule Roe.208
The text next provides an edited version of Casey.209 This
excerpt contains portions of: Parts I-IV, V-B-E, VI,2 10 Justice
Stevens' concurrence in part and dissent in part, 2 11 Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in part, concurrence in judgment in part,
and dissent in part,212 Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in
judgment in part and dissent in part, 2 13 and Justice Scalia's
concurrence in judgment in part and dissent in part.2 14
199. Id
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 444-45.
204. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 445-46.
205. Id. at 446-47.
206. Id. at 447.
207. Id.
208. Id at 447-48 (citing Estrich & Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writingfor an Audience of
One, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 119 (1989)).
209. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 448-57.
210. Id at 448-54.

211.

Id. at 454.

212.
213.
214.

Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 455-56.
Id.at456-57.
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The notes following this decision briefly touch on a number
of issues arising from the opinion and the development of abortion
law more generally. 215 The first note discusses Casey's unexpected
emphasis on stare decisis, citing Constitutional Doctrine for the
proposition that "paradoxically [the authors of the joint opinion in
Casey] seem to give [continuity and stability] undue prominence
relative to their conviction of the rightness of the actual [Roe]
decision-almost as if the decision could not stand on its own and
needed an apology." 216 A second note purports that "all of the
prevailing opinions in Casey refer to the relationship between the
abortion right and gender equality" and cites Abortion, Toleration,
and Moral Uncertainty for the premise that Casey, for the first time,
addressed one of the central issues in abortion, namely "the effect of
abortion laws on the status of women." 2 17 The next note examines the
undue burden standard, as both a facial and as-applied challenge. 2 18
Within this note, the text includes a summary of the majority's
opinion in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England.2 19 The final note discusses the issue of partial birth
abortion. 220 The note includes summaries of the separate opinions
from Stenberg v. Carhart.22 1 The note also mentions that several years
later, "the Court came to the opposite conclusion with respect to the
constitutionality of a federal ban on late-term abortions entitled the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003."222 This statement serves as
an introduction to the edited opinion of Gonzales v. Carhart,
including excerpts from the majority opinion, Justice Thomas'
concurrence, and Justice Ginsburg's dissent.223
ROTUNDA

Rotunda addresses the majority of the abortion discussion
within the section of the textbook entitled "Fundamental Rights,"
falling within the Equal Protection chapter.2 24 Like many of the other

215. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 457-59.
216. Id at 457 (citing Fried, ConstitutionalDoctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (1994)).
217. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 457 (citing Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and
Moral Uncertainty, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1).
218. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 457-58.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 458-59.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 459.
223. Id at 459-62.
224. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 864.
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texts surveyed, Rotunda introduces the issue with excerpts from Roe
v. Wade, offering parts of the majority opinion and paragraph
summaries of any excluded portions. 2 25 The text also includes a small
excerpt from the Chief Justice Burger's concurrence, Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, and Justice White's dissent, and notes that the
concurring opinions of Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart are

omitted.22 6
Following the Roe opinion, Rotunda provides several notes
summarizing other abortion jurisprudence, discussing each case in
one or two paragraphs. 227 These cases include Doe v. Bolton,2 28
23 0 Planned
Connecticut v. Menillo,229 Colautti v. Franklin,
23
Parenthoodof Central Missouri v. Danforth, 1 Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health,23 2 Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive
Health, Inc.,233 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetriciansand

Gynecologists, 23 4 Maher v. Roe,235 Harris v. McRae,236 Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,237 and Rust v. Sullivan.238
The next excerpted opinion provided at length is Casey.23 9 The
edited version is introduced with a paragraph explaining the
breakdown of justice votes on each portion of the opinion 24 0 and then
includes portions of: Parts I-IV, V-A-E, 24 1 Justice Stevens'
concurrence in part and dissent in part,242 Justice Blackmun's

225.
226.

Id. at 864-71.
Id. at 870-71.

227.
228.
229.

Id. at 871-76.
Id. at 871-72.
Id at 872.

ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 872.
231. Id. at 872, 873 (noting the presence of a divided court and Justice White's dissent).
232. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 873 (providing a summary of Justice Kennedy's plurality

230.

opinion and Justice Blackmun's dissent).
233. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 873-74 (including an excerpt from Justice O'Connor's

dissent).
234. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 874 (providing a summary of Chief Justice Burger's dissent
and Justice O'Connor's dissent).
235. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 874-75 (noting that Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and

Marshall filed dissents).
236. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 875 (providing a summary of Justice Brennan's dissent and
noting that Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun filed dissents).
237. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 875 (noting that the Court was fragmented and providing a
summary of Justice Stevens' concurrence in part and dissent in part).
238. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 875-76 (providing a summary of Justice Blackmun's dissent,
Justice Stevens' dissent, and Justice O'Connor's dissent).

239.
240.
241.
242.

ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 876.
Id.
Id. at 876-87.
Id. at 887.
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concurrence in part, concurrence in judgment in part, and dissent in
part,243 Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in judgment in part and
dissent in part, 2" and Justice Scalia's concurrence in judgment in part
and dissent in part.2 45 The first note following the edited opinion
provides a summary of Ayotte v. Planned Parenthoodof Northern
New England, noting that the decision was unanimous. 246 Another
note provides information about state courts allowing non-viable
fetuses to bring wrongful death actions and includes a statement from
Kathryn Kolbert 24 7 saying "Recognition of the nonviable fetus as an
individual person is a back-door way to undermine the rights
guaranteed," and another statement from Charlotte Snead2 48
explaining that the women-plaintiffs "were robbed of their choice ...
Except for a wreck or an injury there would've been a normal
child." 24 9 The last note contains a lengthy summary of the Stenberg v.
Carhart decision. 25 0 Following this discussion, the text provides a
brief statement from columnist George Will of the Washington Post
that offers a hypothetical situation in which categorizing a partialbirth abortion as a "choice" seems more difficult."
Apart from this main treatment of abortion, there are a
number of other portions scattered throughout the textbook, touching
on abortion-related issues. One note summarizes the decision of
Bigelow v. Virginia, which held that Virginia could not punish a
newspaper publisher for printing an advertisement paid for by an
abortion referral agency.25 2 Another note again summarizes the Harris
v. McRae decision, focusing on the Hyde Amendment, and quoting
the majority's statement that "the Hyde Amendment . .. is as much a

reflection of 'traditionalist' values towards abortion as it is an
embodiment of the views of a particular religion."2 53

243. Id.
244. Id.at887-91.
245.
246.

ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 891-95.
Id. at 896 (summarizing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthoodof Northern New England, 126

U.S. 961 (2006)).
247. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 896. Kathryn Kolbert is affiliated with the Center for
Reproductive Law and Policy, which advocates abortion rights.
248. Id. Charlotte Snead is affiliated with West Virginians for Life.
249.

Id. (citing Frances A. McMorris, Courts are Giving New Rights to Fetuses, WALL ST. J.,

Sept. 4, 1996, at BI, col. 4, 5 & B2 at col. 4).
250.
251.
252.

ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 896-99.
Id. at 899 (George Will, Editorial, WASH. POST, June 29, 2000 at A3 1).
ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 1173.

253.

Id. at 1447.
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Lastly, the text also includes excerpts of Madsen v. Women 's
Health Center, Inc. in the "Injunctions and Public Forum" section of
the "Freedom of Speech" chapter. 254 The text includes portions of
Parts I-III of this opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence in
judgment in part and dissent in part, and a paragraph of Justice
Stevens' concurrence in part and dissent in part. 255 The text then
includes lengthy summary of Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of
2
11
Western New York, 25 as well as a summary of Hill v. Colorado.
Rotunda follows this edited opinion with two hypothetical situations,
which focus more on free speech claims than abortion.258
VARAT, COHEN, AND AMAR

The majority of the discussion surrounding abortion lies
within a section of the Due Process Clause chapter of the textbook
entitled "Protection of Personal Liberties."2 59 More specifically, the
issue of abortion is contained under the heading "Personal
Autonomy." 260 The text introduces the topic with a short paragraph
summary of the Eisenstadt v. Baird decision, concluding with this
statement from the Court: "if the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.""2 6
The text then follows with an edited version of Roe v. Wade,
including excerpts of Parts I, V, VII-XI and from Justice Rehnquist's
dissent.262 It notes that Justice Stewart concurred but no further
information is given about the opinion. 2 63 Directly after the edited Roe
v. Wade opinion, there is a short paragraph mentioning the
companion case, Doe v. Bolton, and noting that the concurring and
dissenting opinions in that decision were addressed to both Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton.2" Following this paragraph summary, there

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id at 1082.
Id at 1082-92.
Id at 1092-94.
Id. at 1094-95.

259.

VARAT ET AL., supra note 6, at 408.

260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id at 408-09.
Id at 409-18.
Id at 417.

264.

Id at 418.

ROTUNDA, supra note

5, at 1095.
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are excerpts of Chief Justice Burger's concurrence, Justice Douglas's
concurrence, and Justice White's dissent.26 5
The textbook next provides an edited version of Casey.266 The
opinion is introduced with a short summary of which Justices joined
specific parts and includes portions of: Part I, II, III-A, III-B, III-C,
IV, V-A-E, VI, Justice Stevens' concurrence in part and dissent in
part, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in part, concurrence in
judgment, and dissent in part, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence
in judgment in part and dissent in part, and Justice Scalia's
concurrence in judgment in part and dissent in part. 267 Following the
Casey opinion, the text includes the excerpted opinion of Gonzales v.
Carhart,including portions of Parts I-A, I-B, II, III-C, IV-A, IV-B,
V, a short paragraph of Justice Thomas' concurrence, and excerpts
from Parts I-IV of Justice Ginsburg's dissent.2 68
In addition to the main section addressing the abortion topic,
Varat also includes a long excerpt of the Harris v. McRae decision,
regarding public funding of abortions, under a section in the Equal
Protection Chapter entitled "Protection of Personal Liberties." 26 9 The
text includes portions of: Parts I-III270 of the majority opinion, Justice
Brennan's dissent, Justice Marshall's dissent,271 Justice Blackmun's
dissent, and Justice Stevens' dissent.272 It notes that Justice White
concurred but does not include any portion of that opinion. 273 Apart
from the edited versions of these decisions, there is no further
discussion of the abortion issue, or citations to relevant journal
articles in any notes.

CONCLUSION
The discussion of both euthanasia and abortion is fairly
uniform between the five textbooks surveyed. Initially, the texts
appear to offer a fairly balanced treatment of abortion and euthanasia.
Most texts provide excerpts from articles, as well as citations, that
265.

VARAT ET AL., supra note 6, at 418-20.

266. Id. at 420.
267. Id. at 420-39.
268. Id. at 439-50.
269.

Id. at 752-61.

270.
271.

Id. Part III of the excerpt includes portions of subparts A, B, C-1, and C-2.
VARAT ET AL., supra note 6, at 752-61. The text provides excerpts of Parts I, II-A, B, and

C, and Ill of Justice Marshall's dissent.

272.
273.

Id at 752-61.
Id. at 757.
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clearly offer a pro-choice argument. However, after these citations,
many texts supply additional citations with parentheticals that
promise a contrasting or opposite view. Rather than offering a viable
pro-life argument, which a novice may expect from these articles,
these "opposite" or "contrasting" views tend to be pro-choice
arguments approached from a different perspective. When the text
includes literature or arguments from a pro-life point of view, the
arguments are discussed briefly compared to the other articles, not
allowing the student to fully grasp the argument or the reasons behind
it. For example, a number of textbooks include excerpts from Judith
Jarvis Thomson's A Defense of Abortion, but not one offers any
critique of her article.
The bias also presents itself within the language and
quotations selected to discuss issues further illuminating the abortion
controversy. One text's introduction to the topic exemplifies this bias
in language most clearly by stating, regarding abortion, that the Court
"expanded the right to privacy to assure women the right to
2
Another book includes an argument that fetuses should
abortion."m
be viewed as humans, but then negates any strength of this argument
by pairing it with Peter Singer's discussion of animals being viewed
equally with humans.275
As mentioned, these instances of bias are not immediately
apparent. It is only after looking at these sources more closely that
one becomes aware of the strong pro-choice bias that the textbooks
characterize as balanced.

274.
275.

FARBER ET AL, supra note 2, at 50.
STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 687.

